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ABSTRACT 
We develop a model of the dynamics of economic sanctions in conjunction 
with the response of the sanction target. We apply this model to the case of the 
EU and US boycott of Iranian oil. Our VAR model finds significant impacts of 
sanctions both on key economic variables and on the political system. These 
effects, however, are limited in time and occur in the first two to four years of 
the sanction episode only because adjustment of economic structures mitigates 
the economic and political impact of the sanctions. 
Keywords 
Vector autoregressive model, sanctions, Iran. 
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Early phase success and long run failure of economic 
sanctions.1 
With an application to Iran 
1 Introduction 
The first two years of a sanction episode are crucial for the success of 
economic sanctions. According to the Hufbauer et al. (2008) dataset 55% of 
the successes (that is changes of behaviour and/or political regime type) occur 
during the first two years of a sanction episode. The probability of success 
decreases substantially after this initial phase of a sanction episode (Table 1).2 
The mirror image of this empirical regularity, namely the longevity of sanction 
episodes, has drawn the attention of many authors. Patterns of success, failure, 
duration and termination of long-lived sanctions have been related to the 
target’s and sender’s institutional characteristics and the changes therein (Bolks 
and Soyawel, 2000, McGillivray and Stam, 2005), commitment strategies 
(Dorussen and Mo 2001) and Bayesian learning (van Bergeijk and van 
Marrewijk 1995). 
TABLE 1 
Frequency distribution of duration of post-1945 sanctions 
Duration Failures (%) Successes (%) Ratio 
 (A) (B) (B/A) 
< 1 year 17 41 2.4 
1-2 years 6 14 2.3 
2-3 years 15 9 0.6 
> 4 years 62 37 0.6 
100 100 
Note: Totals may not add up to 100% due to rounding 
Source: Calculations based on Hufbauer et al. (2008) 
Our paper is a natural component to this literature as we offer an explanation 
of why success predominantly occurs in the early phase of a sanction episode. 
We analyse the economic dynamics of an economy that is hit by economic 
sanctions since this enables us to zoom in on the early short run and later long 
run phases of a sanction episode in order to uncover the economic drivers of 
                                                
1  Sajjad Faraji Dizaji is at Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran. This working 
paper was written while he was a visiting scholar at ISS 
2 A problem with Table 1 might be its partial bivariate nature and also that the table 
reports on on-going sanctions that eventually might succeed. Detailed multivariate 
logic analyses however, do not find differences with respect of the impact of 
duration on sanction success in ended and on-going sanctions, respectively; see 
van Bergeijk (2009), Table 6.4, p.131 
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the empirical regularity that successes by and large occur in the early phase of 
the sanctions. We design a Vector Autoregression (VAR) model for Iran that 
includes economic and political variables. Our methodology has its roots in 
economics (Sims 1980), but has long been recognized as a useful approach in 
political science as well (Freeman, Williams and Lin, 1989), in particular when 
it is important to distinguish the short-run and long-run impact of 
interventions (see for example Enders and Sandler, 1993). Our model 
simultaneously investigates the impacts of sanctions both on selected key 
economic variables (exchange rate, consumer price index, investment, 
government consumption, imports and GDP per capita) and the political 
system (in particular shifts in democratic versus autocratic elements). These 
effects are limited in time and occur in the early phase of the sanction episode 
only. So our VAR estimates show that adjustment of economic structures 
mitigates the effects, the effectiveness and success of the sanctions. 
Our paper studies the topical case of sanctions against Iran, but has a 
much wider application. The choice of country application is motivated, firstly, 
by the availability of recent VAR models for the Iranian economy that deal 
with the main sectorial target of US and EU sanctions, namely oil exports 
(Dizaji 2012, Farzanegan, 2011, Farzanegan and Markwardt, 2009) and, 
secondly, by our observation that the current debate is mainly qualitative and 
based on interpretation of selected events (see for examples Maloney 2009 and 
Esfandiary and Fitzpatrick 2011). The analysis of this particular case could thus 
benefit from an empirical analysis. This paper contributes to the debate on 
sanctions against Iran by clarifying a number of economic issues in this 
discussion and by pointing out the linkages between economics and politics 
and vice versa. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a 
theory that relates sanction effectiveness (sanction damage) and sanction 
success (compliance with the sanction sender’s objective) to economic 
adjustment over time. We use the neoclassical trade model to clarify that 
sanction damage is largest in the early phase of the sanction episode while in 
the long run the economic benefits of compliance reduce. Both these points 
have been overlooked so far as theories have by and large relied on 
comparative statics.3 Section 3 sets out the research design that is aimed at 
estimating a set of 20 relatively small Vector Autoregression (VAR) models 
covering the early 1960s to mid-2000s. The models always include a sanction 
shock variable related to real oil revenues or rents per capita and a political 
outcome variable. Section 4 presents the empirical results for these 20 models 
using impulse -response functions to show the development of the variables 
over time. Building on this set, we then derive a more comprehensive VAR 
model on which we report in Section 5. We also provide a variance 
decomposition as a check. Section 6 concludes. 
                                                
3   Van Bergeijk and Van Marrewijk (1995) come close, but do only address our 
former and not our latter point.  
 7
2 The short-run and long-run impact of  sanctions 
We propose a simplified sanction episode in a neoclassical setting, but focus on 
dynamics rather than the usual comparative statics analysis that has been the 
main analytical economic framework since it was introduced by Kemp (1964, 
pp. 208–17). For ease of exposition we analyse the case of a sanction that cuts 
off all trade. The comparative static analysis sees the long run loss of the gains 
from free trade as the main determining factor for a change of behaviour of 
the target economy’s leadership. The target will not comply if free trade utility 
is less than non-compliance utility (consisting of autarky utility and utility 
derived from non compliance). In the neoclassical model a sanction will 
produce more hardship on the target economy, the more intensive the target’s 
pre-sanction international trade and investment relationships with the sender 
and the more inflexible the target’s consumption preferences and production 
structures.  
FIGURE 1  
Production, consumption and specialization at different stages of international trade 
 
Figure 1 illustrates this model depicting production, consumption and trade. 
The production possibilities curve I shows the maximum attainable 
combinations of goods x and y that can be produced by the economy given the 
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available endowments and technology.4 The curve is concave and its shape 
reflects decreasing return. Consumer preferences are depicted by a selection of 
four convex indifference curves C1, C2, C3 and C4 that each represent 
combinations of x and y that yield a constant level of utility. The further the 
transformation curve and the indifference curve lie from the origin, the higher 
is the level of production c.q. the utility that these curves represent. Finally the 
figure contains two price ratios: the ratio pA that results in autarky (that is if the 
economy does not intend to trade), and the price ratio pW that is the world 
price. Point A, the ‘autarky point reflects long run production and 
consumption in the hypothetical case that no other country exists with which 
the target economy can trade as in the case of a complete sanction. The long 
run post sanction market outcome is determined by the endowments, the 
production function and consumer preferences. Markets are in equilibrium 
balancing demand by consumers and supply by producers for the two goods: 
in point A the rate of transformation (the tangent to the transformation curve) 
equals the marginal rate of substitution (the tangent of the indifference curve) 
and in A obviously x and y are exchanged against the price ratio pA. Point F, 
the free trade point, is the pre sanction consumption point (at a superior utility 
level of C4); the concomitant production point is D and export of y and import 
of x can be easily read as the difference between D and F on the horizontal 
and vertical axes, respectively. The utility level of free trade C4 exceeds the 
utility level of autarky C2.Let UNC be the utility that the target derives from the 
activity that the sender seeks to discourage. The comparative static analysis 
states that the target will comply if UF>UA+UNC. By implications sanctions in 
the comparative static framework will work either directly or never. 
Moving beyond comparative statics, Figure 1 sheds light on the early 
phase of a sanction episode. A non-sanctioned fully specialized economy will 
produce at D and this is thus the production point directly after the imposition 
of sanctions because the factors of production have been used in specific 
combinations and reallocation of the factors of production will take time. By 
necessity consumption therefore drops to D, that is the production mix that is 
actually being produced at the start of the sanction period. Since this 
production combination is the result of decisions that assumed that 
international trade would be possible, the resulting consumption combination 
logically cannot be optimal if trade is impossible. The extent of specialization is 
thus and this situation will yield a lower utility level than in autarky. Since the 
rate of transformation in point D (and the price ratio pw,) is not equal to the 
marginal rate of substitution, consumers are willing to exchange y for x and the 
price of x in this economy increases. The production pattern will adjust, the 
economy de-specializes and more x will be produced until prices settle at pA in 
A. Clearly the time path of utility (Figure 2) is directly related to the 
consumption possibilities in the economy and shows an abrupt drop from 
point F to point D at time T when the sanction is imposed and then the more 
gradual movement towards point A.  
                                                
4   Points within I such as Z can of course be produced but these points are inefficient 
as the economy can be reorganized so as to get a higher level of y for the observed 
level of x.   
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FIGURE 2  
Time path of utility as the economy moves from free trade to autarky due to sanctions 
 
Specialization and de-specialization, however, do not only have an impact on 
the dynamics of the no trade utility level and will also influence free trade 
utility levels. A de-specializing economy will have to re-specialize and bear the 
costs of adjustment towards free trade. We can now reformulate the condition 
for sanction success: the target will not comply if the net present value of the 
stream of future free trade utility is less than the net present value of the 
stream of non-compliance utility (consisting of autarky utility and utility 
derived from non compliance). Both streams are influenced by adjustment and 
the future costs of an on-going sanction. Consider the moment when 
adjustment is almost complete as at time a in Figure 2. The target will consider 
the net present value of the future stream in case of non compliance, equal to  
(UA+UNC)/(1+i) where i is the discount rate as in the comparative static 
analysis and compare this to the net present value of compliance but now 
taking the costs of adjustment and thus less than UF/(1+i). Our analysis of the 
dynamics of adjustment thus gives us two important results: Firstly, the 
strongest impact in terms of utility forgone occurs in the initial phase of the 
sanction episode and, secondly, the long gain of compliance decreases during a 
sanction episode and is lower in the long run than acknowledged by the 
comparative static analysis. On both accounts we expect that sanctions have a 
higher probability of success in the early phase and a lower in the long run. 
The next sections investigate the validity of this description. 
3  Research design 
The key issue in this paper is the interplay of macroeconomic and political 
variables and how these factors determine the result of sanctions. Over the 
past four years on average 83% of Iranian exports, 34% of Iranian government 
revenues and 24% of Iranian GDP were related to the main target of the 
sanctions: the Iranian oil industry (Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 2012, the data refer to Persian calendar). For practical reasons we will 
model the sanctions as a shock to real per capita oil income. From the 
macroeconomic perspective we are interested in the impact of this shock on 
 10 
consumer prices, the real exchange rate, real imports, real government 
consumption, real gross investment and real Gross Domestic Product per 
capita. From the political perspective we want to know if and how changes in 
these macroeconomic variables change the Iranian institutional context with 
regard to the dimension autocracy-democracy.5 The inclusion of the political 
system is straightforward and deploys the standard international political 
science data source Polity IV that describes the combinations of autocratic and 
democratic characteristics of the institutions of government. Subtracting the 
autocracy score from the democracy score yields a summary measure Polity. 
The variable Polity thus detects shifts in the autocracy-democracy dimension. 
For example a shift towards more democracy can be caused by a lower score 
for the sub characteristic autocracy, a higher score for the sub characteristic 
democracy or by any combination where the increase (decrease) of democracy 
is larger (smaller) than the increase (decrease) of autocracy. The stated goal of 
the sanctions is to stop nuclear proliferation, but commentators have also 
linked the sanctions to democratization:  
The new US consensus on Iran favors economic sanctions, preferably 
“crippling” measures that target Iran’s purported Achilles’ heel, primarily as a 
means to derailing an Iranian nuclear weapons capability, but also with hope of 
facilitating a democratic breakthrough (Maloney, 2010, p. 132; see also 
Farzanegan 2011, p. 19) 
We investigate the response of the macroeconomic and political variables to 
the sanction shocks deploying a set of unrestricted vector autoregressive 
models (VAR). The VAR treats all variables as jointly endogenous and does 
not impose a priori restrictions on structural relationships. This is helpful for 
our research because we do not need to specify a priori the structural 
interrelationships between politics and economics (and vice versa) in a sanction 
case.6 All that we need is a specification of the chain of influence between the 
variables and here we can rely both on theory and information collected in 
other descriptive and analytical studies. Obviously, many economic variables 
are relevant and ideally one would include all those variables in the VAR and 
test extensively for robustness of the sequence of the variables.7 Unfortunately 
the data for the polity variable are available only at an annual basis and 
therefore we have only 48 observations (annual data from 1961 to 2008, 
inclusive).8 So we have to be parsimonious. This means that our method runs 
the risk of suffering from omitted variables bias. In order to avoid this 
                                                
5   In our VAR the political system, which in itself is a determinant of sanction success 
(see Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988) van Bergeijk (1999), is thus endogenously 
determined. 
6   See for general discussions of these points: Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991) and 
Enders, (1996). 
7   The Cholesky procedure implicitly assumes recursivity in the VAR model as it is 
estimated. Although theoretical considerations may help in determining the order of 
the variables in the VAR model and ex-post sensitivity analysis may further help 
provide insights regarding appropriate ordering, it remains largely at the discretion of 
the modeller (Eltony and Al-Alwadi, 2001). 
8   For oil and gas rents we have 46 observations only. 
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problem as far as possible we will follow an alternative approach pioneered by 
Christiano et al (1996) and Jansen (2003) in section 4 and then move on to a 
more comprehensive model in section 5. They analyze a set of separate VARs 
that always include the starting variable and the result variable (in our case: the 
sanction shock and polity), but different sets of transmission variables. We 
always use an oil revenues related variable as the most exogenous amongst the 
VAR variables, because oil prices and consequently oil revenues are 
determined by world market conditions and we expect that significant shocks 
in oil revenues affect contemporaneously the other key macroeconomic 
variables in the system. Like Christiano et al (1996) and Jansen (2003) we 
always include one key macroeconomic variable (imports c.q. government 
consumption) that we combine with other variables (government consumption 
c.q. imports or gross fixed capital formation or Gross domestic product per 
capita or real exchange rate or consumer price index). We always include polity 
because we want to investigate if and how changes in the key macroeconomic 
variables due to the shocks to oil revenues (oil and gas rents) caused by 
economic sanctions will change political behavior. Diagram 1 illustrates the 
conceptualization of the VAR models; all in all we estimate 20 separate VAR 
models based on two different (oil revenue versus oil and gas rents9) per capita 
measures for the sanction shock, two different key economic indicators and 
five economic variables that are entered separately in the VAR model. We 
report the results in section 4. Then we move on in section 5 and build a more 
comprehensive VAR by considering the results of the 20 small VAR models. 
DIAGRAM 1  
Conceptualizations of the VAR models 
Beginning of the process Economic impact End of the process 
OIL REVENUE SHOCK MACRO ECONOMIC VARIABLES POLITICAL VARIABLE 
Real oil revenues per capita 
or 
Real oil and gas rents per 
capita 
1. Imports 
2. Government consumption or 
gross fixed capital formation 
or Gross domestic product 
per capita or real exchange 
rate or consumer price index 
Polity 
Real oil revenues per capita 
or 
Real oil and gas rents per 
capita 
1. Government consumption 
2. Imports or gross fixed capital 
formation or Gross domestic 
product per capita or real 
exchange rate or consumer 
price index 
Polity 
                                                
9   Rent is the difference between the output value of non-renewable resources (oil 
and gas in this case study) and intermediary consumption (or intermediary costs). 
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3.1 Choice and sequence of variables 
The starting point is the boycott of oil that is modeled as a negative shock in 
oil revenue per capita c.q rent per capita. This way of operationalizing is in line 
with recent VAR models on the Iranian economy in the context of economic 
sanctions (Dizaji 2012, Farzanegan 2011). We expect that significant shocks in 
per  capita oil revenues and rents affect contemporaneously the other key 
macroeconomic variables in the system and the polity variable.  
Next we proceed to motivate the choice of the key economic variable that 
we want to include in the VARs. We will present two variants: imports and 
government expenditures. Providing two variants will enable us to demonstrate 
robustness of some of the key findings.  
Government expenditures 
The common practice in recent VAR modelling of the Iranian economy (Dizaji 
2012, Farzanegan, 2011, Farzanegan and Markwardt, 2009) is to use public 
consumption expenditures (including current consumption, rents and 
depreciation) as a key variable. Current expenditures (payments of 
governmental employees, subsidies and so on.) try to preserve the current 
capacities of government administration. Since 1970 a large and growing wage 
bill of the public sector reflects the dominant role of the government in the 
economy, especially since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Subsidies also play 
an important role in the size and inflexibility of current expenditures in Iran. 
The government, as a main recipient of oil rents, redistributes part of the oil 
revenues through different kinds of subsidies. The inflexible structure of 
government expenditure suggests substantial exogeneity with respect to other 
‘downstream’ variables. Recent analysis (Farzanegan, 2011) however indicates 
that the impact of oil revenues on different categories of government 
expenditure is limited (actually the only significant impact is on military 
expenditures). For this reason we also consider an alternative variant, in casu 
imports. 
Imports 
The reason to include imports is straightforward. Imports are rationed and 
changes in the other explanatory variables cannot increase imports beyond that 
level. The rationing is an immediate consequence of the boycott that reduces 
the availability of foreign currency and this will by necessity lead to a reduction 
of imports in a hard currency constrained economy.10 
                                                
10   The target economy has some temporary leeway in running down international 
reserves and in theory could borrow on the international capital market. In the case of 
Iran this is not realistic also in view of the restrictions on international payments that 
form part of the US and EU sanctions. 
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Further downstream: gross fixed capital formation, GDP per 
capita, exchange rate and CPI 
Both imports and government expenditures have an impact on the quality and 
quantity of new capital goods. In the longer run this will reduce the production 
capacity of the economy. All factors (reduced government expenditures, 
reduced gross capital formation, reduced production and reduced imports) 
inject scarcity in the economy and this will influence relative prices. Two 
important candidates to take these effects into account are the Consumer Price 
Index (Spindler 1995) and the real exchange rate (Sobel 1998). 
Polity 
All in all sanctions reduce government expenditure and investment and deprive 
the economy from (some of) the gains from international trade and this 
disutility influences the target’s behaviour. The economic variables ultimately 
have an impact on the political system leading to shifts in the underlying 
autocracy and democracy scores of Polity.  
3.2 Econometric issues 
We use the vector autoregression (VAR) model to understand the 
interrelationships among our variables.  The VAR model provides a 
multivariate framework that relates changes in a particular variable to changes 
in its own lags and to changes in other variables and the lags of those variables. 
The mathematical representation of a VAR is: 
 
yt= A1yt-1+…+Apyt-p+Bxt+εt      (1) 
 
where yt is a vector of k endogenous variables, xt is a vector of d exogenous 
variables, A1,…,Ap  and B are matrices of coefficients to be estimated, and  εt is 
a vector of innovations that may be contemporaneously correlated but are 
uncorrelated both with their own lagged values and with all of the right-hand 
side variables. We define the vector of exogenous variables as Xt =[constant, 
D1, D2], where D1 and D2 are dummy variables for capturing the effects of the 
Islamic Revolution of 1979 and Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), respectively. Since 
only lagged values of the endogenous variables appear on the right-hand side 
of the equations, simultaneity is not an issue and OLS yields consistent 
estimates. We opt for an unrestricted VAR models in levels. Firstly, structural 
VAR models are “very often misspecified” (Tijerina-Guajardo and Pagán, 
2003).  
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TABLE 2 
Phillips-Perron unit root test 
 Level 1st difference 
Real oil revenue  per capita -2.25 -5.9*** 
Real oil and gas rent per capita -1.43 -5.39*** 
 Real public consumption -2.51 -4.28*** 
Real investment -1.45 -4.41*** 
Real GDP per capita -1.90 -3.76*** 
 Real exchange rate -2.13 -6.71*** 
Real imports -1.72 -4.84*** 
Polity -2.09 -7.27*** 
***: Null hypothesis rejection at 1% 
Secondly, as reported in Table 2 the Phillips-Perron unit root test indicates that 
all variables are integrated of order 1, so I(1).11 If all the variables in the system 
are non-stationary, it is better to use a VAR in levels (Fuller 1976). Since we 
have a variety of VAR models we determine the lag length for each VAR 
separately. For the model of this study the lag length of 2 is the modal score of 
the LR, FPE, AIC and HQ criteria. We estimate our model using annual data 
for the period 1965 to 2008 (oil revenues) or 1961 to 2006 (oil and gas rents). 
All variables except for polity are in logarithmic form. Appendix I discusses the 
data and the sources.  
The main tools in the VAR model estimation are the impulse response 
functions and variance decompositions.  Impulse response functions enable us 
to study the dynamic response of the macroeconomic variables to sanction 
shocks. With the impulse response functions we can observe both the 
magnitude and statistical significance of such responses to one standard 
deviation increase in the oil market related variable (Stock and Watson, 2001). 
We refer to the discussion above regarding the choice of our variables. 
4 Empirical results 
Table 3 summarizes the results for the 20 estimated VARs (Appendix 2 
provides the impulse response functions of all VARs and variables). This study 
empirically investigates the impact of sanctions on the Iranian economy. The 
impulse response functions trace out the response of current and future values 
of the variables in the system to a one standard deviation decrease in the 
current value of oil revenue(rent) errors.  
Table 3a reports on VARs that use real oil revenues per capita as a shock 
variable and 3b on VARs that use real oil and gas rent per capita as a shock 
variable. The upper part of Tables 3a and 3b reports VAR variants that always 
                                                
11   We also applied the ADF test with similar results although government 
consumption expenditures were stationary in their level. 
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include imports and the bottom part of the tables reports on VARs that always 
include government expenditures. Each line in the tables represents a different 
specification of the VAR and reports on the sign and significance of the short 
term (up to 5 years after the initial shock) and the long-run (10 years after 
initial shock) impact according to the impulse response functions.12 For 
example, the first line in Table 3.a states that imports are reduced due to the 
sanction shock and this effect is significant in the short term but is not 
significant anymore in the long-run. In this VAR the intermediate variable is 
government expenditure which shows a similar pattern. The polity variable is 
positive in the short run representing a move towards a more democratic 
framework and negative in the long run. The change in polity does not meet 
our requirements for significance.  
TABLE 3a  
VARs with real oil revenues per capita as sanction shock variable 
Intermediate  INTERMEDIATE IMPORTS POLITY 
Short run Long run Short run Long run Short run Long run 
Government 
consumption 
Negative Negative Negative Negative Positive Negative 
Gross capital 
formation 
Negative Negative Negative Negative Nil Negative 
GDP per 
capita 
Negative Negative Negative Negative Positive Negative 
Exchange rate Negative Nil Negative Negative Negative Nil 
CPI Positive Negative Negative nil Positive Negative 
INTERMEDIATE GOV. CONS. POLITY 
 
Short run Long run Short run Long run Short run Long run 
Imports Negative Negative Negative Negative Positive Negative 
Gross capital 
formation 
Negative Nil Negative Negative Positive Negative 
GDP per 
capita 
Negative Positive Negative Nil Nil Negative 
Exchange rate Negative Positive Negative Negative Positive Negative 
CPI Positive Negative Negative Negative Positive* Negative 
Notes: Significant deviations in bold * Border case almost significant 
                                                
12   We determine significance using standard procedures calculating confidence bands 
around the impulse response function (Sims and Zha 1999) and report significance if 
the null hypothesis of “no effects of impulse variable shocks” on the specific variable 
can be rejected (Berument et al., 2010). Short term significance can also occur in a 
limited number of years in the first five years; long run effects always refer to the 10th 
year. 
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TABLE 3b  
VARs with real oil and gas rents per capita as sanction shock variable   
 
Intermediate  INTERMEDIATE IMPORTS POLITY 
Short run Long run Short run Long run Short run Long run 
Government 
consumption 
Negative Negative Negative Negative positive* Negative 
Gross capital 
formation 
Negative Nil Negative Negative Positive Negative 
GDP per 
capita 
Negative Negative* Negative Negative Positive Negative 
Exchange 
rate 
Nil Nil Negative Negative Positive Nil 
CPI Nil Negative Negative Negative Positive Negative 
Intermediate INTERMEDIATE GOV. CONS. POLITY 
Short run Long run Short run Long run Short run Long run 
Imports Negative Negative Negative Negative positive* Negative 
Gross capital 
formation 
Negative Nil Negative Negative Positive Negative 
GDP per 
capita 
Negative Positive Negative Nil Positive* Negative 
Exchange 
rate 
Negative Positive Negative Negative Positive Negative 
CPI Positive Negative Negative Negative Positive Negative 
Notes: Significant deviations in bold * Border case almost significant 
The information uncovered in the 20 VAR models allows for the following 
robust conclusions: 
• We find strong and consistent evidence for an initially significant 
negative economic impact of sanctions that wanes at the end of the 
simulation period for government consumption, imports, gross capital 
formation and GDP per capita. 
• The evidence for the impact on prices and exchange rate is weak as 
significance is the exception.  
• The impact on polity is consistent (although not always significant) 
showing in most of the cases a change from positive to negative, and 
in the other cases a change in the same direction (from positive to zero 
or from nil to negative). This implies that the political impact of 
sanctions although is occasionally positive in the short term 
deteriorates in the long run. 
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5   Extended VAR and variance decomposition 
The previous section by considering only a limited number of the variables 
may run the risk of omitted variables bias. In order to address this problem we 
follow an intermediate strategy by specifying a VAR model that includes those 
variables that are supported by the findings reported in section 4.  
5.1 VAR 
We do not include CPI and exchange rate in view of their weak performance in 
all variants and use oil and gas rents per capita in compare with oil revenues 
per capita as the sanction shock variable and have the following Cholesky 
ordering in our VAR system: real oil and gas rents per capita, real public 
consumption, real imports, real gross capital formation, real per capita GDP, 
polity.  This ordering, indicates that oil rents have an influence on public 
consumption expenditures and then later on all other variables in the model. 
Oil revenues basically depend on world market conditions so its behavior is the 
least determined by other variables that we include in the model. Section 3 
clarified that (a) government expenditures are strongly influenced by oil shocks 
and (b) transmit the effects of sanctions to other macroeconomic variables 
significantly. Hence their second position in the Cholesky ordering.13 The 
negative development in oil and gas rents due to the economic sanctions 
decrease the financial sources first for financing imports and second for 
investment projects. The changes in these economic variables influence per 
capita GDP and ultimately the changes in the economic variables affect 
polity.14 For our comprehensive VAR model the lag length of 3 is selected on 
the basis of the LR, FPE, AIC and HQ criteria.15 
Figure 3 reports the impulse response functions that trace out the 
response of current and future values of the variables in the system to a one 
standard deviation decrease in the current value of real oil and gas rents per 
capita. In addition to the response of each variable to a one standard deviation 
shock in the impulse variable the figure shows confidence bands. Figure 3 
shows that a negative shock in real per capita oil and gas rents is accompanied 
                                                
13   An additional reason is that the inflexible structure of government expenditure 
implies that it is relatively exogenous (i.e. in comparison with variables further down 
the Cholesky ordering). 
14   As robustness test for our VAR model we also calculated the generalized impulse 
responses (GIR) of our variables in the VAR system to a one standard deviation 
shock in real oil and gas rents per capita. This method has been introduced by Pesaran 
and Shin (1998) in order to avoid the difficulties of identifying orthogonal shocks in 
VAR models. The GIR functions construct an orthogonal set of innovations that does 
not depend on the VAR ordering. Our findings showed that the responses in GIR are 
similar to those which we obtained using Cholesky one standard innovation. 
15   Three lag order selection criteria supported a lag length of 3, one criteria (SC) 
select lag number of 1  and another one (AIC) supported lag  length of 4 as the 
optimum lag. Thus, the lag length of 3 is used for estimation of the VAR model; IRFs 
and VDCs in this section. The lag specification tests are available upon request.   
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by, on the one hand, negative and statistically significant responses in oil and 
gas rents per capita, real public consumption expenditures, real imports, real 
gross capital formation and real GDP per capita and, on the other hand, a 
positive response in polity. Real public consumption expenditures (Figure 3b) 
decrease rapidly and for 7 years before recovering (after 7 years the impact is 
also no longer significantly different from zero). Imports (Figure 3c) decrease 
for 4 years, but the impact is only significant in the 2nd and 3rd years. Real 
investment (Figure 3d) decreases for 5 years and then also looses its 
significance. Per capita GDP (Figure 3e) decreases for 5 years and this decline 
is no longer significant after the 6th year. Figure 3f shows that the sanction 
shock has a significantly positive effect in the 1st year only and this turns into 
an increasingly more negative effect in the 7th year, however, without becoming 
significant before the end of the simulation period. 
5.2 Variance decomposition analysis 
We also examine the forecasting error variance decomposition to determine 
the proportion of the movements in the time series that are due to shocks in 
their own series as opposed to shocks in other variables. Table 4 shows that 
almost for all of the variables the biggest portion of variations is typically 
explained by the variables’ own trend in the first year. Hence at the start of the 
simulations the historical trend of each variable explains a large part of its own 
variations. The only exception is for GDP per capita, as about 36 per cent of 
its variations in the first year are explained by oil and gas rents reflecting high 
dependency of GDP per capita on oil and gas rents in Iran (compare also that 
at this increases to 46% at the end of the simulation period). 
FIGURE 3  
VARs with real oil and gas rents per capita as sanction shock variable  (Lag: 3) 
3a Response of real oil rent per capita                        3b  Response of public 
consumption 
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 3c Response of imports                                            3d Response of gross capital formation 
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 3e  Response of GDP per capita                              3f Response of polity  
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The variance decomposition analysis finds that for most of the variables except 
polity the biggest portion of variations in the long run (after 10 years) is 
explained by the variations in oil and gas rents. This implies the important role 
of oil and gas rents in explaining the variations in Iranian macroeconomic 
variables. In combination these findings suggest that sanctions that bite into 
the oil and gas rents can affect the Iranian key macroeconomic variables 
directly, but the impact on its polity is indirect. In the long run at the end of 
the simulation period the biggest portion of variations in polity are explained 
by the shocks to imports illustrating the importance of foreign trade as a 
determinant of changes in the political behavior.  
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TABLE 4 
 Variance decomposition 
 loilrentpc lpubcons limp linv   GDP pc.       polity 
Variance Decomposition of loilrentpc    
1 Year 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 Years 71.93 10.15 4.07 3.36 1.22 9.24 
8 Years 55.09 8.90 15.99 4.00 9.34 6.65 
10 Years 46.38 9.65 18.94 3.73 15.56 5.72 
Variance Decomposition of lpubcons     
1 Year 25.91 74.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 Years 63.33 22.58 4.85 2.73 3.39 3.08 
8 Years 67.10 10.16 8.30 4.71 8.22 1.48 
10 Years 57.34 7.58 15.06 4.67 14.02 1.30 
Variance Decomposition of limp     
1 Year 0.34 38.11 61.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 Years 26.17 26.18 37.54 5.17 2.39 2.53 
8 Years 40.17 14.72 31.13 3.42 8.79 1.74 
10 Years 36.46 11.73 34.07 3.52 12.67 1.53 
Variance Decomposition of linv    
1 Year 1.20 15.95 16.38 66.45 0.00 0.00 
4 Years 43.44 27.59 11.52 11.40 3.74 2.28 
8 Years 48.49 12.46 22.84 6.06 7.48 2.65 
10 Years 41.80 9.68 27.39 5.72 13.07 2.31 
Variance Decomposition of lgdppc    
1 Year 36.06 10.38 0.46 18.12 34.95 0.00 
4 Years 62.99 18.10 4.22 4.71 6.68 3.26 
8 Years 58.82 8.60 16.42 4.59 8.57 2.96 
10 Years 45.42 7.60 24.34 4.12 15.69 2.79 
Variance Decomposition of polity    
1 Year 18.86 0.29 14.87 0.89 1.73 63.34 
4 Years 16.06 8.40 34.52 0.84 3.22 36.94 
8 Years 15.81 9.14 35.47 0.89 8.25 30.40 
10 Years 15.64 11.80 37.49 1.46 6.87 26.70 
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6   Concluding remarks 
The impact of an oil boycott on the Iranian is considerable: oil and gas rents 
are important drivers of the Iranian key macroeconomic variables and 
ultimately of its political system. A reduction of these rents creates economic 
costs that act as incentives for the government in changing its political 
behavior from an autocratic form to an institutional setting that is more 
democratic. This effect, however, is only significant in the first year after the 
sanction shock shock and turns negative after 7 years. These findings reflect 
that even high short term sanction costs will wane off due to adjustment. 
The policy implication of this result is clear: increasing global pressure on 
the energy industry of Iran, which is the core element of very recent sanctions, 
may cause initial effective damage on the Iranian key macroeconomic variables 
possibly softening the negotiation position of Iran. In the long run the 
sanctions however are likely to have the opposite effect. 
These findings are relevant for the policy debate on economic sanctions 
against Iran that all to often assume that “protracted duration” is a key 
prerequisite for success (Maloney 2009, p. 132) or that sanctions will not 
persuade “Iran to return to the negotiation table”  (Esfandiary and Fitzpatrick 
2011, p. 147). 
Our significant results, in contrast with these reported impacts of an oil 
boycott, indicate that both key economic variables and the political system are 
not immune for economic coercion by other states. The agreement between 
our results and other literatures are that the impact is limited in time and 
occurs only in the first phase of the sanction episode. After the initial phase 
adjustment of economic structures mitigates the economic and political impact 
of the sanctions. Sanctions may work in the short term; their impact in the 
long run is limited at best. 
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Appendix I   Data sources and description 
Considering the ability of the data we use annually data for the period 1965 to 
2008 while the oil revenues per capita is the shock variable and also annually 
data for the period 1961 to 2006 while oil and gas rents per capita is the shock 
variable.  The variables considered in this paper are as follow: 
• Real public consumption expenditure (pubcons) 
This variable is extracted from the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) online database 
and it is on the base of constant prices of 1997. 
• Real imports (imp) 
This variable is extracted from the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) online database 
and it is on the base of constant prices of 1997. 
• Domestic prices (cpi) 
This variable is Iranian consumer price index and has been extracted from IMF 
via Data stream. 
• Real GDP per capita (gdppc) 
This variable is Gross domestic product of Iran on the base of constant prices 
of 1997 extracted from the Central Bank of Iran online database and it is 
divided by population. (The data for population has been extracted from IMF 
via Data stream). 
• Real gross fixed capital formation (inv) 
Formally it is gross domestic fixed investment on the base of constant prices 
of 1997 and it is extracted from CBI online data base. 
• Real exchange rate (exr) 
This is official rate of US dollar in Iranian domestic prices extracted from CBI 
online data base, and it is divided by CPI to become in real term.  
• Real oil revenues per capita (oilrpc) 
This is the Iranian government incomes from the oil exports extracted from 
the CBI online data base and it is divided by CPI and population to become in 
real and per capita terms respectively. 
• Real oil and gas rents per capita (oilrentpc) 
This variable is oil, gas, refined product value added on the base of constant 
prices of 1997 extracted from CBI online data base and it is divided by total 
population. 
• Polity (polity) 
This variable is the modified version of the POLITY variable indicated as 
Polity2 in our data source. The modifications were added in order to facilitate 
the use of the POLITY regime measure in time-series analyses; see Marhall 
(2011) 
 
Data sources were accessed May 20, 2012. CBI data base is available at  
http://www.cbi.ir/simplelist/5796.aspx and http://tsd.cbi.ir/
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Appendix II   Impulse response functions for 20 different VAR 
specifications 
FIGURE A1 
Ordering: loilrpc, imp, pubcons, polity (Lag length: 1) 
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FIGURE A2 
Ordering: oilrpc, imp, inv, polity (Lag length: 1) 
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FIGURE A3 
Ordering: oilrpc, imp, gdppc, polity (Lag length: 1) 
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FIGURE A4 
Ordering: oilrpc, imp, exr, polity ( Lag length: 1) 
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FIGURE A5  
Ordering: oilrpc, imp, cpi, polity (Lag length: 2) 
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FIGURE A6 
Ordering: oilrpc, pubcons, imp, polity (Lag length: 1) 
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FIGURE A7 
Ordering: oilrpc, pubcons, inv, polity (Lag length: 2) 
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FIGURE A8 
Ordering: oilrpc, pubcons, gdppc, polity (Lag length: 3) 
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FIGURE A9 
Ordering: oilrpc, pubcons, exr, polity (Lag length: 1) 
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FIGURE A10 
Ordering: oilrpc, pubcons, cpi, polity (Lag length: 2) 
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FIGURE A11 
Ordering: oilrentpc, imp, pubcons, polity (Lag length: 3) 
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FIGURE A12 
Ordering: oilrentpc, imp, inv, polity (Lag length: 4) 
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FIGURE A13 
Ordering: oilrentpc, imp, gdppc, polity (Lag length: 1) 
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FIGURE A14 
Ordering: oilrentpc, imp, exr, polity (Lag length: 1) 
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FIGURE A15 
Ordering: oilrentpc, imp, cpi, polity (Lag length: 2) 
 
Response of oilrentpc to oilrentpc   Response of imp to oilrentpc 
          
-.4
-.3
-.2
-.1
.0
.1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
 
Response of cpi to oilrentpc                                             Response of polity to oilrentpc         
-2.4
-2.0
-1.6
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
-.25
-.20
-.15
-.10
-.05
.00
.05
.10
.15
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-.16
-.12
-.08
-.04
.00
.04
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 38 
FIGURE A16 
Ordering: oilrentpc, pubcons, imp, polity (Lag length: 3) 
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FIGURE A17 
Ordering: oilrentpc, pubcons, inv, polity (Lag length: 3) 
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FIGURE A18 
Ordering: oilrentpc, pubcons, gdppc, polity (Lag length: 3) 
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FIGURE A19 
Ordering: oilrentpc, pubcons, exr, polity (Lag length: 1) 
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FIGURE A20 
Ordering: oilrentpc, pubcons, cpi, polity (Lag length: 2) 
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